

## THE POET, THE CRITIC, AND THE MORALIST: HORACE, *EPISTLES* 1.19

I begin by quoting from two valuable recent works on Horace. Professor Brink in his *Horace on Poetry* (1964) writes: 'The centre of the short piece lies in lines 21–34. Readers, among them critics and poets, had denied one aspect of the *Odes* which was surely above criticism—the striking originality of these poems. Horace's defence turns on the question of originality' (p. 180) and '*Epistle* 19 is unique in that it alone among the literary satires and letters reiterates Horace's claim to be the Latin *fidicen*' (p. 182). And Dr. McGann in his *Studies in Horace's First Book of Epistles* (Collection Latomus 100: 1969): 'In *Ep.* 19. . . as in the literary satires, Horace is a practising poet or at least a very recently practising one, engaged in defending himself against hostile criticism' (p. 40) and 'As the only epistle concerned exclusively with literary matters, the nineteenth stands apart' (p. 82). Now interpreters have differed about the tone of *Epistles* 1.19. Fraenkel calls it 'the only thoroughly bitter document we have from Horace's pen' (*Horace* (1957), p. 350) and claims that in it 'Horace vented his annoyance' (*ibid.*, p. 339); in this he reads the poem much as Heinze did. Not all have followed this view;<sup>1</sup> and it is hard to deny that a spirit of satirical irony or humorous reserve pervades much at least of the piece. But what seems to be widely agreed is that Horace is here defending the originality and replying to the critics of his lyric poetry, and that he does so as what he calls himself in the *Odes*, 'Romanae fidicen lyrae'.

It may, then, be worth the trouble of expressing some misgivings about this view. They are of two kinds. First: what exactly does the poem say about Horace's poetry and its critics? There is, of course, no reason why the *Epistle* should not be a fiction from start to finish.<sup>2</sup> Clearly this is true of some elements in it: no one would maintain, for example, that Horace ever issued an edict forbidding sober men to compose poetry. But allowing that the poem can be used to some degree as historical evidence, what emerges from it? First Horace tells us he has imitators. How they imitate him is left obscure. We have only a hypothetical dictum of the poet's and the hypothetical reaction of his followers, for whom he expresses contempt. He then goes on to speak of his own originality: the purpose of this, however, is not to defend himself against any critics, but to contrast himself with his imitators. Lines 26 f. anticipate a merely imagined criticism: in rhetorical language, they are a *προκατάληψις* or *praeoccupatio*. He now turns to the ungrateful readers, who are said to criticize him in public, though secretly they admire him. (This secret admiration must, of course, be Horace's own inference, like his explanation of their behaviour.) Again we are not told how they criticize him. What follows is yet another hypothesis: an altercation between

<sup>1</sup> See Brink, *op. cit.*, p. 180 n.4; McGann, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 f.; G.W. Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (1968), pp. 24–8. Becker, *Das Spätwerk des Horaz* (1963), p. 45, rightly prefers to see an ethical purpose in the poem, its theme being 'die *imitatio* im ganzen Leben'. But

this accounts only for lines 1–20, or at a pinch, 1–34; and he does not develop the *aperçu*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 27: 'If there is a core of fact in this lively piece . . . and 568: 'As in *Epistles* i 19, he [the poet] may take a situation—or invent one . . .'

Horace and such a reader, which, like the account of the imitators, is not at all concerned with poetic quality.

Now if Horace was concerned to vindicate his lyric poetry against his critics, he might have told us that his evaluation of it was a reply to them. And if his aim was to assert his own originality as a poet, he might have avoided heaping such a quantity of irrelevant matter around lines 21–34. Faced with so much that is invention—and richly humorous invention—the reader may feel tempted to say with Professor Brink that ‘the centre of the short piece lies in lines 21–34’ or to speak with Professor Williams (op. cit., p. 568) of ‘a serious core which is the real reason for the poem . . . the statement of his conception of the originality which he attained in the Odes’. But we should beware of making ‘serious’ mean the same as ‘factual’, or ‘funny’ the same as ‘imaginary’; for on that criterion Attic tragedy would be far funnier than Attic comedy. And a poem represents a unitary world: to distinguish real from invented elements within it is to sift what the poet has deliberately blended. We need, then, to reconsider *Epistle* 19, allowing each section to contribute its part to the whole. We need also to bear in mind Horace’s own words, ‘ridentem dicere verum quid vetat?’ (*Sat.* 1.1.24); for if something is funny, it by no means follows that it is not serious as well.

The second misgiving concerns the place of *Epistle* 19 in the book. In *Epistle* 1 Horace proclaims (10 f.):

nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono:  
quid verum atque decens curo et rogo, et omnis in hoc sum.

This clearly states a programme for the entire volume. The *Epistles* are something other than poetry not, of course, because they do not have the qualities that poetry in the best and broadest sense should display, but because, as Horace makes quite clear, he is no longer the poet as *lusor*, the artist unconcerned with right living. And in *Epistle* 19 Horace recalls the image with which he began *Epistle* 1: there he was the retired gladiator, unwilling to return to the fray, here he is a wrestler who swiftly withdraws from it (45–7). The words *diludia* and *ludus* here echo *ludo* and *ludicra* there.<sup>3</sup> If, then, Horace speaks as a lyric poet here, that conflicts with his own programme. Now it is true enough that at the end of the piece ‘Horace hints . . . that in withdrawing from literary polemic and from poetry itself, he has other reasons than fear of criticism’<sup>4</sup> (i.e. his allegiance to philosophy). But we still have a right to wonder whether in the rest of the poem Horace has so signally ignored his ethical *point de repère*.

This raises a larger question: do any of the *Epistles* in Book I fall outside the scope of the programme implied in the first? There are perhaps three of which that might most plausibly be held: 5, 9, and 13. About 13 I shall have something to say later; so I now briefly consider 9 and 5.

*Epistle* 9 is a letter of commendation; but it is firmly centred upon a fine point of ethics. Horace risks one of two things: by writing to Tiberius on Septimius’ behalf, he may appear vain and importunate, but if he did not write, he would give the impression of selfishly denying his power to help a friend. In other words, the danger is that he seem either to over- or to underestimate himself, or in Greek terms, succumb either to *αλαζόνεια* or to *ειρώνεια*.<sup>5</sup> So, by a

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Dilke in *Horace*, ed. Costa (1973), p. 106.

<sup>4</sup> McGann, op. cit., p. 85.

<sup>5</sup> See K.-H. on lines 8–9, who aptly

quote Arist. *E.N.* 1127<sup>a</sup> 22 f.: ὁ δὲ εἰρων . . . ἀρνείσθαι [sc. δοκεῖ] τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν.

striking reversal of the conventions of the *litterae commendatariae*, it is what the person commended knows and reveals about the commender, not the other way round, which counts most in the poem.<sup>6</sup> The result is a thumbnail sketch of a moral dilemma about status, friendship, and their proper uses.<sup>7</sup>

In *Epistle* 5 Horace is the host, but no less the devotee of philosophy. In the central section of the poem where he praises wine and describes its effects he is following an ethical tradition which allows or even encourages the wise man to drink deeply at times. This can be traced back as far as one of Aristotle's dialogues, the *Symposium* (frg. 102 Rose); it is also represented by Seneca in the *De tranquillitate* (17.8 f.).<sup>8</sup> Both writers praise the relaxing power of wine, Aristotle deriving μέθη from μεθίεναι, Seneca connecting Bacchus' title *Liber* with *liberare*; and Horace seems to echo such thoughts in the words 'contracta quem non in paupertate solutum?' (20). He also fortifies his position with the maxim (12–14)

quo mihi fortunam si non conceditur uti?  
parcus ob heredis curam nimiumque severus  
adsidet insano . . . .

This belongs to the store of topics on avarice, the subject of a treatise by Plutarch; and one of his remarks is particularly close to Horace (*Mor.* 524 F): καίτοι πῶς οὐ μανικὸν οὐδὲ οἰκτρὸν τὸ πάθος εἴ τις ἱματίῳ μὴ χρῆται διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν μηδὲ ἄρτω διὰ τὸ πεινῆν μηδὲ πλούτῳ διὰ τὸ φιλοπλουτεῖν.<sup>9</sup> The heir on whom Horace will waste no concern is also typical of such contexts.<sup>10</sup> So Horace has what he has just praised in Tibullus, 'divitias . . . artemque fruendi' (*Ep.* 1.4.7). At the same time he brings out the tendency of drink to produce delusion and even disorder, no less than to release; so much so that he seems almost to be advocating something quite incompatible with philosophic reflectiveness. As he coyly puts it (15),

. . . patiarque vel inconsultus haberi.

This softens the impact of his precepts, which might not find favour with a public figure like his addressee; for the same reason he directs those precepts at himself, not Torquatus. But it also makes Horace a strange master of ceremonies (*συμποσίαρχος*), for as such he should hold his liquor;<sup>11</sup> and the proper conduct of symposia, including the role of the symposiarch, is a theme on which philosophers had thought fit to legislate.<sup>12</sup> The incongruity is heightened when he goes on to speak of his task as a host in the terms of a consul or censor giving orders to an aedile (21 ff.).<sup>13</sup>

So we are reminded that in *Epistles* 1 Horace is far from having achieved wisdom: here we have a glimpse of him as capable of mere folly. *Epistle* 15 and, more ruefully, *Epistle* 8 make a similar point. Here, then, as throughout the book, the poet is both a model and a fallible human being.

<sup>6</sup> e.g. Cic. *Ad Fam.* 13.2, 3, 5.2, 15.1, 27.2.

<sup>7</sup> See also McGann, *op. cit.*, p. 58, whose book as a whole ably argues that *Epistles* I is unified by its ethical concern.

<sup>8</sup> McGann, *op. cit.*, p. 21 n.7 adduces this passage; he also has helpful remarks on the philosophical character of the *Epistle* (pp. 44–6). Cf. too *Od.* 3.21.9–20.

<sup>9</sup> The Loeb editors compare Teles p. 33. 2 ff. Hense (see also his note on p. 37.6); H. *Sat.* 2.3.104 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 526 A; H. *Ep.* 2.2.190–2.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 620 C; Pl. *Laws* 640 C–D.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Athen.* 585 B; Pl. *Laws* 671 C ff.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. K.-H. ad loc.

So if it might be wrong to suppose that in *Epistle* 19 Horace could not have abandoned his ethical concerns, it would be at least a mistake to assume it without careful reflection. I intend, then, simply to go through the poem, trying to consider it as a unit in itself and as part of Book I of the *Epistles*.

By way of a preliminary, it may be useful briefly to consider the other place in the book where Horace deals with poetry, *Epistle* 3. Here he comments on the work of three younger men, Titius, Celsus, and his addressee, Florus. Titius exemplifies courage or originality (10 f.).<sup>14</sup>

These qualities are described in the language of Callimachean aesthetics:<sup>15</sup> he turns up his nose at 'reservoirs and open river-banks' and prefers the pure Pindaric spring. There is some irony in this praise, for Horace elsewhere in declining to imitate Pindar compares him to a mighty river (*Od.* 4.2.5–8)—as Callimachus did the poets he despised; and just before in this *Epistle* we have seen the eminently Pindaric task of celebrating Augustus' deeds (cf. *Od.* 4.2) likened to building a public watercourse. Now Horace goes further: is he still following Pindar

an tragica desaevit et ampullatur in arte? (14)

By employing the figure of speech whereby an author is said to do what his characters do,<sup>16</sup> Horace casts aspersions on the seemingly commendable boldness of his friend. Titius risks becoming infected with the rage of the tragic hero; and *ampullatur* (what the actor does)<sup>17</sup> recalls the contemptuous word *ληκυθίουσα* used of tragedy by that very Callimachus (frg. 215) whose precepts Titius had seemed to be obeying. Horace turns to Celsus, who stands at the opposite extreme. His vice is plagiarism; and Horace gently castigates it by developing the metaphor of theft implicit in the Greek and Latin words for that practice (*κλοπή* and *furtum*). Celsus appears as the embezzler, even the temple-robber (15–17):

... monitus multumque monendus  
privatus ut quaerat opes, et tangere<sup>18</sup> vitet  
scripta Palatinus quaecumque recepit Apollo.

The point is reinforced by a fable, through which, as so often in the *Satires* and *Epistles*, Horace makes a moral point with humour and delicacy. The reference to poetry is also maintained, since *color* in the language of literary criticism means 'style'<sup>19</sup> and the comparison of poets to birds is a commonplace: in particular, the crow stands for the servile imitator in a famous passage of Pindar (*Ol.* 2.87). Thus far, then, Horace comments on writers who represent in the

<sup>14</sup> For *ausus* (line 11) used of originality in literary contexts, cf. line 20; Enn. *Ann.* 216; Cat. 1.5; Virg. *G.* 4.565; Claudian, *Rapt. Pros.* 1.3. For *τολμᾶν* et *sim.* in Greek, see P. O. 9.82; Call. *Iamb.* 13.19; Hermogenes, 216.17–22 Rabe.

<sup>15</sup> K.-H. ad loc. compare Call. *Epig.* 28; note also *H.* 2.108 ff.

<sup>16</sup> See K.-H. on *Sat.* 1.10.36 f.; Kassel, *Rb. Mus.* 109 (1966), 8–10; Cairns, *CQ N.S.* 21 (1971), 207 n.1. This parallelism can also grow into a theory of poetic composition: cf. Ar. *Thes.* 148–56; Arist. *Poet.*

1455<sup>4</sup>29–34; H. *A.P.* 102–5.

<sup>17</sup> For the dramatic author described as if he were the actor, again with moral implications, cf. H. *Ep.* 2.1.170–4. I take the metaphor of the *ampulla* to refer, in Horace at least, to the blown-out cheeks of a speaker: cf. *A.P.* 94; Hermogenes, 247. 12–15; Prop. 2.30.18, with Cairns, art. cit. 206–12. In general, see Brink on *A.P.* 97.

<sup>18</sup> On the overtones of this word, see *CQ N.S.* 23 (1973), 303; note also Gaius 3.195.

<sup>19</sup> See H. *A.P.* 86 and Brink ad loc.

language of Aristotle's ethics, an excess (*ὑπερβολή*) and a deficiency (*ἐλλειψις*).<sup>20</sup> His strictures recall Alexandrian aesthetics; but they are at the same time to all intents and purposes moral strictures, because ethical categories are applied to poetic technique.

Now Horace turns to his addressee. At first Florus seems to be in no need of criticism: he has natural gifts which have been well cultivated, and so he can count on success in whatever activity he undertakes. But for him Horace reserves a different message (25–7):

quodsi  
frigida curarum fomenta<sup>21</sup> relinquere posses,  
quo te caelestis sapientia duceret, ires.

This entails a quite different view of poetry, which is now lumped together with the law under the heading *curae* (or *frigida curarum fomenta*). Poetry is not an agile flitting from flower to flower, as Horace had just implied (21); it is merely, like other worldly cares, a cold compress which stops a man moving to his true goal under the guidance of philosophy. Here, then, Horace depreciates poetry by setting it against philosophy. So we have two main strands of thought in this passage: the discussion in strongly moral terms of the poet's craft and the condemnation of poetry as a distraction from true wisdom. Both these strands run through the whole of Horace's literary writings: we might recall in particular *Epistles* 2.2 where the true poet is described with seriousness and dignity as a 'censor honestus' (109–25)<sup>22</sup> and where we then read (141–5):

nimirum sapere est abiectis utile nugis,  
et tempestivum pueris concedere ludum,  
ac non verba sequi fidibus modulanda Latinis  
sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae.

These two ways of thinking are, I suppose, contradictory; but the contradiction is a problem which touches the very worth of poetry as a human activity and which Horace expounds with incomparable force and subtlety. On the one hand, to quote a later poet and critic, there is 'the intolerable wrestle with words and meanings'; on the other, 'the poetry does not matter'.<sup>23</sup>

Now for *Epistle* 1.19.

Horace begins with the dictum of Cratinus, that water-drinkers will never produce poetry of note, and goes on to confirm it by the notion that the poet is the follower of Bacchus and by the examples of Homer and Ennius. The rich humour of this section is based on two ideas widespread in ancient literary criticism: that poetry is a matter of inspiration, so that the poet must be mad<sup>24</sup> or,

<sup>20</sup> This theory is also taken over into literary criticism: see Brink on *A.P.* 31; Russell in the Introd. of his 'Longinus', p. xxxiv.

<sup>21</sup> I see no decisive reason for preferring the one to the other interpretation of this phrase, 'the cold compresses of your worldly concerns' or 'useless remedies for your troubles'. Perhaps the ambiguity is deliberate and suggests that concerns like poetry and the law, though meant to be a remedy

for cares, are in fact themselves cares. At all events, *frigida* . . . *fomenta* is clearly a pun; and for *curae* as both 'activities' and 'troubles', see *Ov. Tr.* 1.11.12.

<sup>22</sup> Note, however, how the last two lines of the passage, with their abrupt switch to the metaphor of mimic dancing, cast a characteristically ironic light on what went before.

<sup>23</sup> T.S. Eliot, *East Coker*, 70 f.

<sup>24</sup> See Brink on *A.P.* 295–8.

in more homely terms, drunk; and that the poet's life and character are reflected in his work.<sup>25</sup>

There is an allusion to poetic madness in 'male sanos' (3). The notion goes back to Plato and Democritus; but the particular form Horace gives it here implies a contrast between archaic and Alexandrian writing. The water-drinker *par excellence* among poets is Callimachus. It is probable that at the beginning of the *Aetia* he described himself as receiving in a dream a draught of water from the Muses on Helicon,<sup>26</sup> and in his surviving work the image of the uncontaminated spring represents his own kind of writing.<sup>27</sup> And when Horace says that Bacchus admitted poets to the company of Fauns and Satyrs, he recalls a passage from Ennius (*Ann.* 213 f. V), who, speaking there in pure Callimachean vein, despises those who wrote

versibus quos olim Fauni vatesque canebant.

Further, later attacks on Callimachus and his imitators allude to his sobriety, and contrast it with the drunkenness of Homer: thus Horace's approximate contemporary, Antipater of Thessalonica (*A.P.* 11.20)<sup>28</sup>:

Φεύγεθ' ὅσοι λόκκας ἢ λάρνιδας ἢ κασαμῆνας  
ἄδετε, ποιητῶν φύλον ἀκανθολόγων,  
οἳ τ' ἐπέων κόσμον λελυγισμένον ἀσκήσαντες  
κρήνης ἐξ ἱερῆς πίνετε λιτὸν ὕδωρ  
σήμερον 'Αρχιλόχοιο καὶ ἄρσεως ἡμαρ 'Ομήρου  
σπένδομεν' ὁ κρητῆρ οὐ δέχεθ' ὕδροπότας.

Horace too takes Homer as a contrast to the 'water-drinkers', adding Ennius for good measure: both represent the epic genre which Callimachus rejected. Cratinus himself belongs in their company in so far as in literary theory 'impressiveness and elevation of language' (τὸ δευὸν καὶ ὑψηλὸν τοῦ λόγου: Aristophanes, ed. Dindorf, iv.27.9 f.) or the quality of grandeur (Quintil. 10.1.65) can be ascribed to Old Comedy. Now Horace pretends to side with the wine-bibbers—I say 'pretends', because the passage is full of ironies and qualifications.<sup>29</sup> *Si credis* implies that Cratinus need not be believed; and the adjective *prisco*, stressed by its place at the beginning of the poem and by the hyperbaton which separates it from its noun, brands the old comedian as also old-fashioned: this is in contrast to the Callimachean 'novelty',<sup>30</sup> which Horace himself exemplifies later in the poem (23–34). *Docte* means not only that Maecenas will already be familiar with Cratinus' words and appreciate what follows here, but also that he is endowed with *doctrina*, a quality associated with the Alexandrian manner and one which will make him no friend to the poetry of unmixed inspiration.<sup>31</sup> *Male sanos* is clearly contemptuous; and we might compare the satirical account of the mad

<sup>25</sup> See Bramble, *Persius and the Programmatic Satire* (1974), pp. 16–25; Sandy, *Phoenix* 25 (1971), 54.

<sup>26</sup> See Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik* (1965), pp. 72–5.

<sup>27</sup> See *H.* 2.110–12; cf. *Epig.* 28.

<sup>28</sup> Adduced, with other relevant passages, by K.-H.

<sup>29</sup> I rather labour this point, because both K.-H. (on line 8) and Fraenkel (op. cit.,

pp. 340 f.) seem to suppose that Horace is here in some degree seriously committed to 'wine-drinking' and contrasting his own poetry with that of 'water-drinkers'.

<sup>30</sup> See N.-H. on *Od.* 1.26.10.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. e.g. *Ep.* 2.1.56 where *docti* stands in implicit contrast to *alti* ('elevated'). Note also that *doctus* can apply to philosophic, as well as literary, learning: e.g. *Ep.* 1.18.96.

poet which ends the *Ars Poetica*. Finally, *exemplar vitiis imitabile* (17) makes it clear that Horace's championship of 'wine-drinking' was an aberration.

Now what the virtue of Homer and Ennius consists in is not of interest here. They are seen only in the distorting mirror of inferences that can be drawn about their behaviour from their work. Such inferences, here as elsewhere, are a rich source of comedy or ridicule. Aristophanes makes the most of them in the *Acabnians* and *Thesmophoriazusae*: Euripides is himself lame and has a study full of rags, because his heroes are lame and ragged:<sup>33</sup> Agathon dresses and behaves like a woman, because his drama is effeminate: ὁμοία γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει (*Thes.* 167). So also Polybius (12.24) makes fun of Timaeus for forming conclusions about the lives of Homer and Aristotle from the subjects they dwell on in their writings.<sup>34</sup> Perhaps too Horace means us to recall that there is a passage in the *Odyssey* (21.293–304) which warns at length against the ill effects of too much wine; so if the reasoning of 'laudibus arguitur vini vinosus Homerus' is valid, it cuts both ways—and in fact, Athenaeus devotes one of his characteristic *longueurs* (10 E–11 B) to illustrating how the bard attacks drunkenness. The humour is still more marked where Ennius is concerned. He himself had said 'numquam poetor nisi si podager'<sup>35</sup> (*Sat.* 64). Horace, not content with exploiting this 'confession', imagines him behaving as his characters behave. The result is the paradoxical picture of the drunken poet leaping forth to sing of battle, like an epic hero springing from his chariot into battle itself.<sup>36</sup>

Horace, then, is far from championing the poetry of mere inspiration; his concern is to poke fun at those who misunderstand and misuse it. So if in the *Odes* he once or twice describes himself as filled with it, that is very far from his position in the *Epistle*.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, we might take it that he has some sympathy at least with the Callimacheans; for there are several echoes of the Alexandrian master later in the poem. Homer and Ennius are no doubt justly revered poets; but as models—and it is imitation which turns out to be Horace's real theme—they could easily lead astray. But Horace is not really concerned with narrower questions about the choice of style or genre. Implicit in the contrast of the two extremes, drunkards and teetotalers, is a view like that of the *Ars Poetica* (409 f.):

ego nec studium sine divite vena  
nec rude quid prosit video ingenium.

The poet may need some kind of 'intoxication'; but if that means he neglects his craft, then, as what follows in the *Ars Poetica* indicates, he is guilty of a moral error.<sup>38</sup> Further, the notion that the poet's life corresponds to his work is treated in a spirit of fun, but it is not meaningless; for it hints at an ethical viewpoint. A certain kind of poetry—or indeed poetry as such, if Cratinus be taken seriously—

<sup>33</sup> For a further aspect of the joke, see *ZPE* 15 (1974), 221 f.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Kassel, loc. cit.

<sup>35</sup> Adduced by K.-H. ad loc. For the connection of gout and wine, see also *A.P.* 11.414 (Hedylus).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *Iliad* 3.29 = 5.494 etc.; 5.111; 11.211; 16.733, 755.

<sup>37</sup> Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 340 n.7 refers, with Dacier, to *Od.* 3.25 (note also *Od.* 3.4.5 f.: 'an me ludit amabilis insania?').

But in view of what was said above, it would be confusing and inappropriate if the *Epistle* picked up the *Odes* here. Neither, then, should line 2 be connected with *Od.* 3.30, as Fraenkel does. To say that a work is lasting is simply, for critics as for poets, a commonplace way of praising it: see e.g. 'Longinus' 1.3, 7. 4, 36.2; *H. A.P.* 346.

<sup>38</sup> On the ethical background and significance of *A.P.* 412–18, see Becker, op. cit., p. 74.

implies a certain kind of behaviour. This behaviour is equated with madness or drunkenness; and mad or drunk is what the philosopher, the *sapiens*, is not: the contrast is made powerfully in *Epistles* 2.2 (126 ff.) and in the *Ars Poetica* (295–308). It is in fact another version of that rejection of poetry for philosophy which Horace makes in *Epistles* 1.1. Both strands, then, of Horace's thinking about poetry in the literary *Epistles* are woven into this delightfully jocular passage.

Now proclaiming his allegiance to wine, Horace delivers an edict:

forum putealque Libonis  
mandabo siccis, adimam cantare severis.

There follows a description of the response to his edict: the slavish obedience of a host of imitators. Horace says nothing about their poetry: he is concerned with their behaviour, or with the practice of literature as a way of life. The subject of this section is emulation (*ζῆλος*), which the Stoics defined as the imitation of virtue (*S.V.F.* 3.413, 415). Horace's imitators are striving to equal him; but they succeed only in reproducing his vices. Such debased imitation is familiar as an ethical theme. Thus Aristotle speaks of men puffed up with pride as 'imitating' the *μεγαλόψυχος* in the respects they are capable of (*E.N.* 1124<sup>b</sup> 2f.); and Plutarch in his essay 'How to tell a flatterer from a friend' writes (*Mor.* 53 D):

ὁ δὲ κόλαξ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ χαμαιλέοντος πέπονθεν. ἐκεῖνός τε γὰρ ἀπάσῃ χροᾷ πλὴν τοῦ λευκοῦ συναρμολογεῖται, καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἐν τοῖς ἀξίοις σπουδῆς ὅμοιον ἑαυτὸν ἐξαδυνατῶν παρέχει· οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ἀμίμητον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ φαῦλοι ζωγράφοι τῶν καλῶν ἐφικνεῖσθαι μὴ δυνάμενοι δι' ἀσθένειαν ἐν ῥυτίσι καὶ φακοῖς καὶ οὐλαῖς τὰς ὁμοιοτήτας ἀναφέρουσιν, οὕτως οὗτος ἀκρασίας γίνεταί μμητῆς, δεισιδαιμονίας, ἀκραχολίας, πικρίας πρὸς οἰκέτας, ἀπιστίας πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ συγγενεῖς.

And when Horace continues

quodsi  
pallerem casu, biberent exsangue cuminum

that is another theme of Plutarch's in the same treatise (51 B–C, 52 A–B, 63 B–C) and of Cicero's in the *De amicitia* (93), how the flatterer keeps changing to adapt himself to his master. The examples of Cato, the epitome of Stoic rigour, and Timagenes, who represents the social virtues of wit and urbanity, give further ethical colouring to the passages; and the vices of the two, vulgar frivolity (*βωμολοχία*) and grim stolidity (*ἀγροικία*) are another Aristotelian excess and deficiency, which *Epistle* 18 begins by discussing.<sup>39</sup> The types of mistaken imitation Horace has in mind are also familiar to moralists: Epictetus (3.22.9–12) reprimands the superficial imitator, the man who thinks that to be a Cynic is simply a matter of dress and demeanour; while Iarbitas' over-ambitious imitation is described in language which recalls Aesop's fable of the frog that tried to blow itself up as big as a cow (Phaedrus 1.24). The same story is used in *Satires* 2.3.314–20 to show that the cobbler should stick to his last; and the corresponding precept occurs at the end of *Epistles* 1.7.

At the same time there are strong literary overtones. *Exemplar* and *vitiis* are both critical terms;<sup>40</sup> and the words *vitiis imitabile*, since *ζῆλος* includes the concept of imitation,<sup>41</sup> are designed to evoke the Greek *κακόζηλον*, another word

<sup>39</sup> See K.-H. on its line 9.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Brink, op. cit., p. 159 n.2 and on *A.P.* 31, 268.

<sup>41</sup> In literary criticism *ζῆλος* and *μίμησης* are often equivalent. See 'Longinus' 13.2 and Russell ad loc.; D.H. *Lysias* 2, *De imit.*



from the language of literary criticism.<sup>42</sup> Horace himself defines the notion in the *Ars Poetica* (24 ff.):

maxima pars vatum, pater et iuvenes patre digni,  
decipimur specie recti; brevis esse laboro,  
obscurus fio; sectantem levia nervi  
deficiunt animique; professus grandia turget . . .

*Aemula . . . studet . . . tendit* render the sense of emulous over-reaching contained in *κακόζηλον*, what Quintilian calls *mala adfectatio* in translating the word (8.3.56). Further, imitation is a topic commonly discussed by ancient critics (note how Plutarch introduced a comparison from art into his account of the flatterer). What the poets hope to achieve in emulating Horace recalls 'Longinus' claim that the nobility of Homer can impregnate and inspire his imitators, as the mystic vapours of Delphi do the Pythian priestess (13.2); and Crates of Pergamon offered as a criterion of value in poetry that it be 'a good imitation of Homer and the classical authors' (τὸ εὖ μιμηθῆναι τὰ [Ὁ]μήρου καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων [ς] παραδεδομένων)<sup>43</sup> — a notion which Philodemus rebuts in terms similar to Horace's.<sup>44</sup> Again, the types of mistaken imitator Horace deals with are both criticized by Quintilian; the one who uncomprehendingly apes outward appearances and the one who tries to go beyond his own powers (10.2.16–21). Cicero too, transposing into a literary key the idea of Aristotle and Plutarch, touches on the theme of inept or slavish imitation rather as Horace does:

. . . multos imitatores saepe cognovi qui aut ea quae facilia sunt aut etiam illa quae insignia ac paene vitiosa consecretantur imitando (*De or.* 2.90) . . . hos vero minime [sc. laudo] qui nihil illorum nisi vitium sequuntur, cum a bonis absint longissime (*Or.* 171).<sup>45</sup>

In short, Horace's concern is with the *concept* of imitation; there is no attempt to identify or characterize any actual attempts at imitating his own work. Rather he is discoursing on a theme common to ethics and criticism. The thought here is also close to *Epistle* 3 since the imitators are both superficial, like Celsus, and infected with the worst qualities of their model, like Titius. And the emphasis is on their behaviour, not their products. The poet's craft is a way of life with its virtues and vices; so the failure of the imitators is a moral as much as an aesthetic failure.

In what follows Horace seems to take up a more definite stance about his own poetry. But before going any further, it will be necessary to consider the exact meaning of those vexed lines. At least three questions of detail require an answer: 1) Does *Archilochi* go with *pede* or *musam*? 2) Does *hunc* refer to Alcaeus or to Archilochus? 3) What do *temperat* and *mascula* mean? With these, two larger questions have to be resolved: 1) What is Horace saying about Archilochus?

1 (p. 203.6–8 Usener-Radermacher) and 2 (p. 204.9–14); Hermogenes, 213.14.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. 'Longinus' 3.4 and Russell ad loc.; Brink on *A.P.* 25.

<sup>43</sup> Philodemus, *Περὶ ποιημάτων* v, ed. Jensen, xxx. 24–xxxii. 33.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. xxi. 17–27: τὸ τε μιμεῖσθαι [τὸ]ν Ὁμήρου ἐμ πᾶσι καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην

καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τεθνασμαμέ[ν]ους οὐκ ἐπιεικὲς εἶναι δόξει· τάχα δ' οὐδ' ἐπιγινώναι δυνήσόμεθα τὴν ὥς προσήκε[ι] τούτους με[μ]ιμημένην, ἐὰν [μ]ῆ [τὸ] πρ[ο]σῆκον εἰδήσω[μ]εν.

<sup>45</sup> Lambinus adduced these passages; cf. also Quintil. 10.1.25, quoted by K.-H.

relation to Sappho and Alcaeus, and his own to all three? 2) Where is he referring to his *Epodes* and where to his *Odes*?

Fraenkel (op. cit., pp. 343 f.) rightly revived an observation of Lucian Müller's: that if *Archilochi* were to be taken with *pede*, the resulting word-order would be unparalleled in the *Satires* or *Epistles*. This suggests we should link *Archilochi* to *musam*. A difficulty, however, arises: '*Archilochi carminis modos et artem*' (op. cit., p. 345). In that case, Sappho and Alcaeus take over Archilochus' metre and technique and in some way modify them, which is what *temperat* on any interpretation must imply, with their own. This gives an unusually limited sense to *musam*; but even granting that, what Horace says of them does not correspond, as it apparently should, to what he said of himself. He was afraid to change Archilochus' metre, whereas they did make such a change. It would not be any better even if *Archilochi* were allowed to go with *pede*, since in that case the Aeolic poets could be said to have used Archilochus' metre, which is plainly false. Nor can either reading be saved by appeal to the theory of *adiectio* and *detractio* whereby 'the Lesbian metres could be derived from elements contained in the verses of Archilochus'.<sup>46</sup> For if we take *Archilochi* with *musam*, the fact remains that Sappho and Alcaeus have changed the iambist's metre; and even if we take *Archilochi* with *pede*, their metre, though it be derived from his, cannot be simply called *Archilochi pes*, especially when Horace has just spoken of him as an iambist (*Parios . . . iambos*).

A fresh start must be made. We can dispense with the pedantry of *adiectio* and *detractio* and give *Archilochi musam* its natural meaning, 'Archilochus' poetry' rather than any one aspect of it.<sup>47</sup> What Sappho and Alcaeus do to Archilochus, then, is not take over and modify his metre, but *temperare* his poetry with their metre. Now the Lesbian poets are his followers simply in so far as all three are writers of one type. He is not, of course, one of the nine *lyrici* in the Alexandrian classification, as Sappho and Alcaeus are; but they all represent personal as opposed to epic poetry and the like. Thus Synesius (*De insomnia* 20) sets Alcaeus and Archilochus who 'both spent their eloquence on their own lives' (*οἱ δεδανηῆκασι τὴν εὐστομίαν εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἑκάτερος*) against Homer and Stesichorus who 'used their poems to glorify the race of heroes' (*τὸ μὲν ἥρωικὸν φῦλον διὰ τὰς ποιήσεις αὐτῶν ἐπικυδέστερον ἔθεσαν*).<sup>48</sup> Or Propertius, contrasting his own work with that of an epic poet, says (1.7.1 ff.):<sup>49</sup>

Dum tibi Cadmeae dicuntur, Pontice, Thebae  
armaque fraternae tristia militiae . . .  
nos, ut consuemus, nostros agitamus amores . . .  
hic mihi conteritur vitae modus . . .

A division of poetry into these two types is also implicit in Horace's own *Satires* 2.1. There he prefers satire to the epic or encomiastic genre, the praises of Augustus (10–23) which Trebatius suggests he cultivate; the lawyer makes a distinction between the poetry of eulogy and the poetry of vituperation which goes back to Aristotle's *Poetics* (1448<sup>b</sup> 24 ff.).<sup>50</sup> But Horace replies with a different distinction; what he stresses about satire in contrast to epic or encomium is

<sup>46</sup> Fraenkel, op. cit., p. 346.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *T. L. L.* viii. 1693.29 ff.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Critias (D.-K. 88 B 44) on Archilochus.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. 2.34.33–44; H. *Od.* 4.9.10–12; *Ov. Tr.* 2. 439 f. In general on lower

genres (epigram, lyric, mime) as 'confessional', see *Ov. Tr.* 2.367 f., 427–30; Quintil. 10.1.100.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Dio Chrys. 33.11 f.; Schol. in Aphthon. 9 (ii. p. 47 Walz).

not its virulent, but its realistic and autobiographical, character: it does not praise the successes of another but lays bare both the good and the bad fortune of the writer himself (28–34):

me pedibus delectat claudere verba  
 Lucili ritu, nostri melioris utroque.  
 ille velut fidis arcana sodalibus olim  
 credebat libris, neque si male cesserat usquam  
 decurrens alio neque si bene: quo fit ut omnis  
 votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella  
 vita senis.

There are even verbal parallels between Synesius and Horace: *vita senis*, for what it is worth, like Propertius' 'hic mihi conteritur vitae modus', corresponds to τὸν οἰκείον βίον in the passage just quoted; and 'neque si male cesserat . . . neque si bene' finds an echo in the same context of Synesius: καὶ τοῖνυν ἡ διαδοχὴ τοῦ χρόνου τηρεῖ τὴν μνήμην ὧν τε ἡλγησαν ὧν τε ἥσθησαν. Further, Aristoxenus, who is perhaps Horace's and Synesius' common source, applied the notion of books as confidants to Sappho or Anacreon and Alcaeus,<sup>51</sup> which again puts lyric poetry in the same autobiographical category as satire or elegy. So in *Epistles* 1.19 the two Lesbian poets are taken to be workers in the same genre as Archilochus who differ from him in metre and, in Alcaeus' case, in other ways.

Now this means that what Horace has said of himself and what he says of them are still not parallel: there remains a difference between them and Archilochus which conflicts with the similarity between him and Horace, who 'was afraid to change his metre and technique'. This difficulty can be resolved if we read the whole passage as follows:

'I modelled myself on Archilochus—not his matter, but his spirit and metre; and if you are tempted to detract from my achievement because I did not change his metre and technique (sc. in the *Epodes*): well, Sappho modifies Archilochus with her metre and so does Alcaeus, but *he*<sup>52</sup> is also different in his matter and its disposition; and I brought him, Alcaeus, into Latin literature (sc. in the *Odes*)'.

In other words, Horace passes from discussing the *Epodes* to discussing the *Odes* at line 28.<sup>53</sup> This is as we should expect, since Sappho and Alcaeus, the poets he avowedly follows in the *Odes*, could hardly be introduced as the exemplar for his practice in the *Epodes*; and the indicative mood of *timui* in 27, which means he admits the imputation of that line, can now have its full force, since he never tries to deny it of the *Epodes*. Further, this reading of the passage explains why the emphasis is on *temperat* and not on *Archilochi*, for Horace is now referring to that part of his work which does differ in fundamental respects from Archilochus; and it also avoids the awkward abruptness of *hunc* (= Alcaeus),

<sup>51</sup> Frg. 71 Wehrli = Porphyrio and Ps.-Acro on H. *Sat.* 2.1.30.

<sup>52</sup> *Sed* contrasts Alcaeus with Sappho (not Horace). The subject of the phrase is stressed even though there is no pronoun: cf. Kroll on Cat. 55.18. In Greek, *Iliad* 12.328, 13.486, 18.308; A. *Eum.* 719; E. *Hec.* 855, *Tro.* 684 f., *El.* 981 (where the reading of L should be retained).

<sup>53</sup> I agree, then, with Lambinus, with

one small difference, that *Sappho* and *Alcaeus* do not mean 'I in my lyrics modelled on Sappho and Alcaeus', but genuinely refer to the Aeolic poets. None the less, the *point* of mentioning them is to lead up to *hunc ego* etc. in line 31, just as the point of making them followers of Archilochus is to parallel Horace's own development from the *Epodes* to the *Odes*.

which comes as too much of an afterthought if lines 28–31 point backwards rather than forwards. Nor can *bunc* refer to Archilochus.<sup>54</sup> Although he is occasionally treated as a lyric poet,<sup>55</sup> it would be very strange, as Bentley pointed out, if Horace were claiming to have imitated, as *Latinus fidicen*, Archilochus, since again, in the *Odes* it is always the Aeolic poets who are his preferred models. It would be no less strange if Horace had omitted to speak of the *Odes* altogether or failed to distinguish *Odes* and *Epodes*,<sup>56</sup> particularly when Sappho and Alcaeus are mentioned in the same context in contrast to Archilochus. So at line 28 Horace deliberately shifts his ground, *recule pour mieux sauter*: he admits his relative unoriginality in the earlier book in order to stress his more thoroughgoing originality in the later one.

What of *mascula* and *temperet*? Now the word *mascula* may well cast a side-long glance at Sappho's sexual leanings; nor need we suppose Horace would avoid such an allusion, when he speaks in *Odes* 2.13.24 f. of 'querentem Sappho puellis de popularibus'. That would also be appropriate in that it would explain why Sappho differs from Archilochus only in metre: her subject-matter is vulgar, unlike that of Alcaeus 'sonantem plenius aureo . . . plectro dura navis, dura fugae mala, dura belli' (ibid. 26–8).<sup>57</sup> But *masculus* is properly, like English 'manly', an epithet of commendation, whether applied to persons<sup>58</sup> or to writings.<sup>59</sup> Such a sense is, in fact, in place here, and should therefore be taken as the word's primary connotation. Horace in the *Epodes* had been 'afraid' to modify the metre and spirit of Archilochus: 'manly' Sappho has the courage to do what he had not dared to there. *Temperat* should be understood as a part of the same metaphorical complex; the usual translations 'mix' or 'soften' are unsatisfactory, because they have no connection with it. The best rendering is something like Heinze's 'ordnend beherrschen':<sup>60</sup> 'manly' Sappho and Alcaeus 'control' or 'master' the unbridled Archilochus. This interpretation points up Horace's amusing play with the conventional idea of male dominance and female passivity: virile Sappho, the woman, gets the better of the muse (feminine) of Archilochus, the man. It also reveals a correspondence between *temperat* and *reget* in line 22: as Horace 'commands' the brawling swarm of imitators, so Sappho and Alcaeus

<sup>54</sup> Two arguments should *not* be used against referring *bunc* to Archilochus: 1) that *bic* must refer to what immediately precedes ('the latter', not 'the former'); 2) that 32 f. are an intolerable repetition of 23 f. For 1) *bic* may refer further back, cf. *T.L.L.* vi (3). 2715. 40 ff. and *Ep.* 1.6.68, 1.17.19; *Sat.* 1.2.7, 1.10.46; *Prop.* 2.34.81; *Tac. H.* 4.81; 2) 32 f. could pick up and emphasize 23 f. as an ἐπιφώνημα: cf. *Ep.* 2.1.94–102; *Sat.* 1.3.9–19.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Wistrand in *Entretiens Hardt* x (1964), 278 f. See also Diomedes, *Gramm. Lat.* i. p. 483 Keil; Firmicus Maternus, *Math.* 6.30.25

<sup>56</sup> As Wistrand argues, loc. cit., pp. 273–9.

<sup>57</sup> For this judgement, which clearly accommodates his ugly personalities about Pittacus as part of a laudable concern with elevated political matters, cf. Quintil. 10.1.63; D.H. *De imit.* 2 (p. 205. 19–21).

Further, La Penna, *Maia* 24 (1972), 208–15.

<sup>58</sup> See *T.L.L.* viii.423.72 ff., 428.1 ff.

<sup>59</sup> See Bramble, op. cit., p.44; also *A.P.* 11.20.5 quoted above. My view of the meaning of this word here is substantially Fraenkel's (op. cit., p. 346)—and indeed Lambinus'.

<sup>60</sup> *Ber. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss., Phil.-hist. Kl.*, 70 (1918), 4 Heft, 25 n.3 = *Vom Geist des Römertums*<sup>3</sup> (1960), p.245 n.38. Cf. *Od.* 1.8.7; 4.3.18; *Sat.* 2.5.71; *Ep.* 2.2.187. *Temperant* in *Od.* 1.20.11 is also, I believe, an example of this sense. The word there corresponds to *domitam* just before: Maecenas drinks the grape 'subdued' by the Calenian wine-press, whereas no Falernian or Formian vintages 'control' Horace's cups. This brings out the contrast in the poem between the public man, dominating through his wealth and dominated by it, and the private man, poorer but free.

'control' the unruly violence of their forbear. They control him with their metre, because neither is an iambist, and the iambus is the embodiment of anger and malice—*numeri* and *animi* are closely linked. Thus Horace himself writes in the *Ars Poetica* (79):

Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo.<sup>61</sup>

There is perhaps here also a pun on the literal sense of *pede*, which occurred six lines back in the same place in the line. Sappho or Alcaeus might be pictured in the prose of the conqueror, like Propertius' god of love (1.1.2)<sup>62</sup>

. . . et caput impositis pressit Amor pedibus.

What, then, is Horace saying about his own poetry here? The passage begins with the word *libera*: this sets Horace as the free man against the *imitatores*, *servum pecus*. The metaphor of freedom and slavery is widespread in ancient ethics, especially in Stoicism; one of its most impressive uses is the end of *Epistles* 1.16. More specifically, Horace here resembles Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος* in contrast to the *κόλακες*, his imitators (*E.N.* 1124<sup>b</sup> 31 ff.): . . . *καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ἤν [sc. ἀναγκαῖον] ἄλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες*. The moral overtones are reinforced by the language of courage and fear.<sup>63</sup> Horace's originality, as Titius' had seemed to be, is a good sort of boldness; in the *Epodes* he showed some timidity, but he overcame it in the *Odes*. *Temperat*, emphatically repeated, also has distinct moral implications, being the verb which forms the adjective *temperans*.<sup>64</sup> Archilochus is the poet of unrestrained virulence; in his *Odes* Horace, like Alcaeus, has brought this quality under control, besides showing independence in seeking new subjects. In fact Archilochus is taken to be the progenitor of lyric poetry here largely in order to stress this notion of control. Had Horace simply said 'I took a fresh model in the *Odes*', that would have blurred the point that his or Alcaeus' originality is a matter not only of boldness or self-confidence, but also of temperance or restraint. Nor is the heavy emphasis in lines 29–31 a mere repetition of 24 f. In 24 f., i.e. in the *Epodes*, Horace has simply modified the matter and the words that go with it; the spirit of Archilochus, which is here associated with his metre, remains untouched. In 29–31, i.e. in the *Odes*, as is brought out by *versibus atris*<sup>65</sup> and *famoso carmine*, the spirit is associated with the subject-matter, and in modifying the one Horace, like Alcaeus, modifies the other. So while Horace is no mere 'water-drinker'—for he follows an inspired poet and a lover of wine, Archilochus—he also tames the uncontrolled aggressiveness of the iambist. In this he is the opposite of his own imitators who manage only to copy the defects of their model. Thus what Horace says he did in the *Odes* here corresponds closely to his disclaimers of malice in the *Satires*;<sup>66</sup> and the preoccupation with *ethos* is common to both. It could be added that all this is said with exemplary

<sup>61</sup> See further, besides Brink ad loc., Call. frg. 191.3 and Pfeiffer ad loc.

<sup>62</sup> On this image, see Stroh, *Die römische Liebeslegie als werbende Dichtung* (1971), p. 47 n.106.

<sup>63</sup> For similar language cf. 'courage' and 'fear' used of an author, see *Ep.* 2.1.166 f., 2.1.182; 2.2.111.

<sup>64</sup> Ogle, *AJP* 43 (1922), 55–9, docu-

ments and rightly emphasizes the connotation of 'restraint' in *temperare*. See further North, *CP* 43 (1948), 11–17.

<sup>65</sup> The word means not only 'deadly', but also 'malicious'; on the latter sense, see Bramble, op. cit., p. 202; cf. L.S.J. s.v. *μέλας*, iii 4.

<sup>66</sup> On these see Bramble op. cit., pp. 190–204.

propriety, for Horace's praise of himself is throughout submerged in his praise of his models;<sup>67</sup> and propriety is again one of the moralist's concerns<sup>68</sup> as Horace announced himself in *Epistle* 1.1.11:

quid verum atque decens, curo ac rogo, et omnis in hoc sum.

At the same time, Horace is here again echoing Alexandrian aesthetics. The imagery of the untrodden path in 21 f. recalls Callimachus' *Aetia* prologue (25–8) and *Epigram* 7. Also echoed is the opening of his *Iambi*:

'Ακούσαθ' Ἰππώνακτος' οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' ἤκω . . .  
φέρων ἱαμβον οὐ μάχην αἰδόντα  
τὴν Βουπάλειον . . .

Callimachus kept Hipponax's metre, but changed both his subject-matter and his quarrelsome spirit.<sup>69</sup> Horace too has effected each of these kinds of change, one in the *Epodes* and both in the *Odes*. *Ordine dispar* should be read in the light of a passage of 'Longinus' (33.5)<sup>70</sup> which contrasts Archilochus' 'sweeping along a mass of disordered matter' (πολλὰ καὶ ἀνοικονόμητα παρασύροντος)—the image recalls the end of Callimachus' second *Hymn*—with the Alexandrian Eratosthenes; and Archilochus is, as we saw, contrasted with Callimachus as the 'wine-bibber' with the 'water-drinker'.<sup>71</sup> So the *ordo* of Alcaeus implies a technique which accords with Alexandrian precepts. Lastly, Horace's change of metre and genre in the *Odes* admirably exemplifies the many-sidedness (πολυειδεια) Callimachus defended in his own work in *Iambus* 13.<sup>72</sup> But the ethical concern is foremost here; and in fact it is present too in the passage from Callimachus' first *Iambus*. Poetic technique is seen again in moral terms. The writer of the *Epistles*, in recalling his *Odes*, naturally recalls also the language of Alexandrian aesthetics that he had so often used there; but he does so as now a devotee of philosophy.

Lines 33 f. make the transition to a new section. *Ingenuis* picks up the metaphor of *libera* . . . *vestigia* and *servum pecus*: Horace is a free man who writes for free men. The same word supplies the contrast to the *ingratus* . . . *lector*, who represents malice and disingenuousness.<sup>73</sup> This figure stands in further contrast to the imitators: they were all too ready to display, ineptly, their admiration for Horace, whereas the ungrateful reader shares the admiration but tries to conceal it. Again, we are moving in the realm of Hellenistic ethics. Seneca, like Horace himself (*Ep.* 1.7.37 f.), suggests that a man who receives a benefit should acknowledge it not only in the benefactor's presence, but everywhere

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Plutarch, 'On inoffensive self-praise' 10 (*Mor.* 542 C–D). Latin poets commonly assert their own originality by referring to their Greek models; but it is natural to detect an ethical implication in this in the context of the *Epistles*.

<sup>68</sup> Especially since Panaetius: see van Straaten, *Panētius* (1946), pp. 160–3.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Dawson, *YCS* 11 (1950), 22. In general on this contrast between Callimachus and Hipponax or Archilochus, see CQ N.S. 23 (1973), 305–7 and W. Bühler, *Entretiens Hardt* x (1964), 231–47, whom I should have mentioned there.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Heinze, *op. cit.*, p. 249; K.-H. also adduce the passages from Call. *Aet.* on line

21.

<sup>71</sup> Archilochus' own work supplies some 'evidence' for such a view: see frgs. 2, 4, 290, and 120 West. Callimachus alludes to the last in frg. 544.

<sup>72</sup> There is an echo of the same principle in *Od.* 1.7.5 which sets Horace apart from those 'quibus unum opus est intactae Palladis urbem/carmine perpetuo celebrare.' *Carminē perpetuo* also recalls a passage of Callimachus: see N.-H. *ad loc.*

<sup>73</sup> For *ingenuus* opposed to *malignus*, see Cat. 68.37 f.; for *ingenuus* implying frankness, see Cic. *De am.* 65; *De off.* 3.57; Cat. 110.5.

(*De ben.* 2.22) and categorizes amongst others a form of ingratitude which consists in pretending not to have received one (*ibid.* 3.1.3). In Greek, Horace's ungrateful reader would be the *βάσκανος* who is contrasted with the *εὐχαρις*, envy and gratitude being contraries.<sup>74</sup>

Here too there is an echo of Callimachus, who attacks his envious detractors in the *Aetia* prologue and at the end of *Hymn* 2; and Callimachean themes persist in what follows. There is the contempt for the common herd and its judgements (*Epig.* 7, 28); and the word *ambire*, besides meaning 'canvas', recalls the dominant metaphor of Callimachus' *Epigram* 28:

'Εχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κύκλικον, οὐδὲ κελεύθω  
χαίρω τίς πολλοὺς ὥδε καὶ ὥδε φέρει,  
μίσειω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον . . .

There is also the rejection of the theatrical (*Epig.* 7; *frg.* 192.12 f., 215); and a poet who calls his own work *nugae* (cf. *Cat.* 1.4) may be allying himself with the Callimachean rejection of epic, while *pondus*<sup>75</sup> evokes the Greek ὄγκος, the quality the Alexandrian spurns by comparing himself to the cicade, οὐλαχὺς, ὁ περροεῖς (*Aet.* 1.32).

But once again the roots of the poem are not in aesthetic ground. Horace does not mention his envious readers in order to defend his poetry or lay claim to renown, but to introduce a complex ethical contrast between himself and them. Having described their reaction, he goes on to explain it. What alienates those readers is that he does not curry favour with the people or the critics, is free, in other words, of the vice of *δοξοκοπία* castigated by Hellenistic moralists.<sup>76</sup> Further, in the phrase 'nobilium scriptorum auditor et ultor' Horace is not claiming to be the defender of the old classics,<sup>77</sup> but sarcastically denying any interest in the follies of contemporary recitations. *Auditor* must be one who attends such recitations; to refer it to Horace's private reading is to twist its meaning. *Ultor* ('avenger'), which prepares for the metaphor of fighting at the end of the poem, implies the pugnacity which Horace throughout this context wishes to avoid; and in any case it cannot, as a matter of Latinity, mean 'defender'. It also recalls a passage in *Epistles* 2.2 (91–103). As there, Horace here would be listening to others reading their own works and getting his own back by reading his in return—the same idea as begins Juvenal's first *Satire*:

semper ego auditor tantum? numquamne reponam . . . ?

The ultimate aim of such a contest is to receive a favourable 'vote' whether from the critics or from other poets or both, and to be judged 'noble' by them. All this Horace rejects, apparently in a spirit of philosophical detachment like that of *Epistle* 1 (70 ff.)<sup>78</sup>.

His declaration of independence *vis-à-vis* his public also corresponds to his claim of originality *vis-à-vis* his models. But faced with a hostile interlocutor he equivocates and pretends that his unsociability springs simply from modesty. With the phrases *spissis indigna theatris* and *nugis addere pondus* he seeks to calm the man, by pooh-poohing his own work. But the interlocutor now pounces, to

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Themistius, 22.268c; Sen. *De ben.*, 3.3.3.

<sup>75</sup> On this word see Brink on *A.P.* 320.

<sup>76</sup> See the references in L.S.J., s.vv. *δοξοκόπος* and cognates.

<sup>77</sup> As Fraenkel argues (*op. cit.*, pp. 348 f.).

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Bramble, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 ff., esp. p. 70 n.1.

lay bare the pride latent in Horace's humble and conciliatory words. The poet is in fact neither self-sufficient nor self-deprecating; he is the embodiment of what Plato calls (*Laws* 731 D–E) the greatest of all evils, blind self-love (*φιλαυτία*), a malady most incident to poets, and above all bad ones: witness Horace himself in *Epistles* 2.2 (106–8):<sup>79</sup>

ridentur mala qui componunt carmina: verum  
gaudent scribentes et se venerantur et ultro,  
si taceas, laudant quidquid scripsere beati.

And if Horace seeks only a select audience for his work, that is not what it appears to be, a sign of modesty. Nothing, it turns out, could indicate better his inflated opinion of himself, for that audience is here none other than the emperor. There are also ironic echoes of his declaration of originality earlier in the poem. *Fidis* and *poetica mella* pick up the boast 'qui sibi fides dux reget examen' (22 f.);<sup>80</sup> only now Horace's attitude is set in a less favourable light by the other man's remark. Further, 'Iovis auribus ista servas' recalls the words *princeps* and *dux* in lines 21 and 23. There Horace claimed to the 'king'—or 'queen-bee'—of the imitators; and here, as the king,<sup>81</sup> he claims the favour of 'Jupiter'—who is, in ordinary language, himself the *princeps*. Again, this makes the poet look unpleasantly proud, whereas the interlocutor commends himself by his wit<sup>82</sup> no less than by his acumen.

Rather similar irony is directed against the poet himself in *Epistle* 13. There Horace, in sending his poems to Augustus, shows a scrupulous concern for decorum<sup>83</sup>—so much so that he seems almost indifferent to their fate (7–9); indeed, he does not even think fit to identify them.<sup>84</sup> This is the attitude of one who has renounced poetry for philosophy. At the same time, his pride in his writings keeps peeping through: they are so weighty that in carrying them to the emperor Vinnius must perform a feat of heroic endurance (this is *nugis addere pondus* with a vengeance!), and the things Horace calls 'a bundle of books' (13) are also 'poems such as to detain the eyes and ears of Caesar' (17 f.). And the poet's admonitions to his messenger reveal not only a desire to be tactful, but also a fear that any tactlessness might spoil the reception of his work. An irony results which dominates the whole *Epistle*: the more anxious Horace shows himself not to pester Augustus, the more he must pester Vinnius; and in fact the letter is only repeating what he has already impressed on him 'many times and at length' (1, cf. 17 *oratus multa prece*) by words of mouth. So both in *Epistle* 13 and in *Epistle* 19 the poet's *amour propre* is the target of the moralist's laughter.

Harassed now by his critic, Horace no longer dares resort to the thinly veiled

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *A.P.* 442–4; *Cic. Tusc.* 5.63 (quoted by K.-H.); *Cat.* 22.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. McGann, *op. cit.*, p. 84, though I see no significant relation between *rides* (43) and *iocum* (20).

<sup>81</sup> Kings are beloved of Zeus: cf. *Iliad* 1.175, 277–9; 2.197; *Call. H.* 1.79–84. More specifically, cf. *Iliad* 9.607 f. (a riposte to 1.175) where Achilles claims that honour from Zeus is enough for him, and the scholiast comments: οὐ καλῶς δὲ χρῆται ταῖς εὐτυχίαις.

<sup>82</sup> See further West, *Reading Horace*

(1967), p. 49.

<sup>83</sup> On this as an ethical topic, cf. above, n.68; further McGann, *op. cit.*, p.66.

<sup>84</sup> Clarke, *CR N.S.* 22 (1972), 156–9 argues that the 'books' concerned are *Epistles* 1 and the poem a commendation of that work. But *carmina* (17) could hardly refer to the book in which Horace has given up poetry. So while Clarke's identification of the poem's literary genre is valuable, we need also to consider how the genre is modified to fit the context of the *Epistles*.



sarcasm of his previous remark (41 f.).<sup>85</sup> He simply retires. At the same time, he tries to make this little conversation seem a mere wrestling-bout, and moreover one in which his opponent is prepared to use unfair means to win (46). The whole exchange might be aptly characterized in the terms of Plato's dialectic, since it is a sort of miniature *ἐλεγχος*, in which, however, both sides are active. *Rides* reveals Horace as lacking in frankness (*παρρησία*), one of the chief qualities Socrates requires in his interlocutors.<sup>86</sup> His response is to stigmatize his opponent as one whose only concern is to win (*φιλόνομος*),<sup>87</sup> and write off the discussion as a mere contest. Plato too characterizes a travesty of dialectic by the metaphor of fighting;<sup>88</sup> and he also treats it as a kind of joke or game,<sup>89</sup> which corresponds to *ludus* in line 48. So Horace can conclude from a position of superiority with a little homily on anger,<sup>90</sup> and even if he is shirking a straight answer to his critic, he could still claim to be behaving morally. As Plutarch puts it (*Mor.* 72 E): *ἡκιστα δὲ προσήκει νοουθετούμενον ἀντινοουθετεῖν καὶ παρρησία παρρησίαν ἀντεκφέρειν· τάχυν γὰρ ἐκκαίει καὶ ποιεῖ διαφοράν, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἀντιπαρρησιαζομένου δόξειεν ἂν ἀλλὰ παρρησίαν μὴ φέροντος ὁ τοιοῦτος ὠθισμός ἐναί.* But in spite of these manoeuvres, Horace is also genuinely shown up. 'Luctantis acuto ne secer ungui' means not only that the other man is a dirty fighter, but equally that he may score a hit, as indeed he already has done. (The Greek words for scratching and biting, *κνίζειν* and *δάκναι*, are also used of something that, as we should say, 'stings'.) His adversary has in fact by his candour done the duty of the friend.<sup>91</sup> He turns out, then, to form a good rather than a bad counterpart to the flatterer-imitators; and he achieves in the moral sphere what Horace requires of the literary critic in the *Ars Poetica* (438–52) and finds in Tibullus (*Ep.* 1.4.1). To quote Plutarch again (*Mor.* 89 B): *ὅθεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μέλλουσι σώζεσθαι φίλων δεῖ γνησίων ἢ διαπύρων ἐχθρῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νοουθετοῦντες τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας, οἱ δὲ λοιδοροῦντες ἀποτρέπουσι.*<sup>92</sup> The wheel has come full circle. At the end of the poem, as at the beginning, we are left wondering whether the practice of poetry does not entail some kind of folly, be it 'drunkenness' or vanity. So *Epistles* 1.19 poses a version of that dilemma about the poet's craft and character which underlies Horace's thinking in all the literary *Epistles*. Horace's lyrics represent a moral no less than an aesthetic standard for poetry; but can that standard be maintained in the person of the poet?

To conclude. *Epistles* 1.19 is a harmonious and uniform whole; and lines 21–34 have a natural place in an argument which is continuous in sense, though characteristically varied in tone. Horace begins by gently mocking the poetry of *ingenium* without *ars*; he goes on to castigate the servile imitators of such poetry, who succeed only in copying their model's drunkenness or madness. He then puts

<sup>85</sup> *Naribus uti* (45), as Lambinus saw, is the Greek *μυκτηρισμός*, which Quintilian defines (8.6.59) as 'dissimulatus quidem sed non latens derisus'. See further, Russell on 'Longinus' 34.2; Bramble, op. cit., pp. 103 f.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. *Crito* 49 D; *Grg.* 487 A–E etc. For laughter as a failure to be frank, see *Grg.* 473 E; cf. *Lys.* 211 C, *Euthyd.* 276 D, 278 D.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *Grg.* 457 C–E, *Phaedo* 91 A, etc.

<sup>88</sup> *Euthyd.* 271 D–272 A, 277 D; *Soph.* 225.

<sup>89</sup> *Euthyd.* 278 B, 283 B. On the range

of meanings of *ludus*, see McGann, op. cit., p. 35 n.5.

<sup>90</sup> On this as a Hellenistic ethical theme, see N.-H.'s introduction to *Od.* 1.16. 49 f. (cf. Orelli ad loc.) may be compared not only with Dem. 54.19, but with Epicharmus frg. 148 Kaibel.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *Sat.* 1.4.132; Cic. *De am.* 88; Brink on *A.P.* 419–37, 438–52; De Witt, *Epicurus and his Philosophy* (1954), pp. 297–303.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. *Mor.* 74 C, 82 A; Cic. *De am.* 90; D.L. 6.12.

himself forward as the free man who made a right use of his inspired exemplar and who had the courage to control its spirit of unbridled malice. Now the envious reader appears who forms a contrast, in different ways, to both the poet and his imitators. Horace criticizes him too and asserts his detachment from his public, as he had emphasized his independence of his model. But even as he wisely scotches anger (what he had done in the *Odes* with Archilochus), he is himself convicted of another error, vanity: the poet becomes, as so often in the *Satires* and *Epistles*, his own butt. Of course, this is also an oblique way of confirming his character as a moralist. And a moralist is what Horace is throughout the poem. His purpose is not to defend the originality of the *Odes* and *Epodes*, nor to express a classicist's devotion to the lyric poets of ancient Greece; and if he often recalls the Alexandrians' aesthetic programme, he does so as a critic, which means here one who scrutinizes literature and its readers or practitioners through an ethical glass. So his own poetry is simply an example; it stands for an originality of technique which merges with rightness of *ethos*. And the critic is in the end—to his credit and our amusement and edification—a self-critic.<sup>93</sup>

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